The Uzbek government’s plan to build a nuclear power plant (NPP) in the Jizzakh region, alongside the creation of a centralized radioactive waste system, marks a decisive shift toward long-term nuclear infrastructure. Officials have presented the project, implemented in partnership with Russia and under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a rational response to rising electricity demand and necessary to further economic growth.

Yet beneath this explanation lies a difficult question: can a water-intensive energy system, which nuclear power is, be sustained in a region where water demand already exceeds supply?

According to a United Nations report, water demand in Uzbekistan exceeds supply by 23 percent and overall water stress has reached 123 percent – a sign that scarcity is no longer a future risk, but a present reality.

A Strategic Response – or a Strategic Bet?

Uzbekistan’s turn to nuclear energy reflects mounting structural pressures. Electricity demand across Central Asia is projected to grow by around 40 percent by 2030, requiring at least 62.8 gigawatts of new capacity.

Political analyst Elyor Usmanov frames the NPP project as a structural response to a widening energy gap, driven by industrial growth, population expansion, and the declining flexibility of gas-based generation.

The project also promises measurable gains. Official estimates suggest the NPP could supply up to 15 percent of Uzbekistan’s electricity while saving roughly 3.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.

But nuclear energy is not a short-term solution. It is a long-term commitment. Infrastructure of this scale operates for decades, embedding financial and technological dependence. As Usmanov notes, such projects act as a “long-term anchor” – economic, technological, and political.

This dependence is already taking shape. Agreements linked to Uzbekistan’s nuclear program are valued at up to $24.7 billion, underscoring both the scale of investment and the depth of long-term commitments. 

The government has approved the creation of a national radioactive waste management center, responsible for transporting, processing, and storing radioactive materials over the long term. The project also includes infrastructure upgrades and the development of specialized laboratories between 2026 and 2027.

As Andrey Ozharovsky, a nuclear physicist and co-founder of the public program Radioactive Waste Safety notes, radioactive materials remain hazardous for decades – and in some cases centuries – requiring continuous monitoring and stable institutional capacity.

In this sense, nuclear energy extends far beyond electricity generation, creating a long-term obligation to manage risk across generations.

A Region Under Pressure

These developments are unfolding in a region already under severe water stress.

Across Central Asia, water availability per capita has declined from around 8,400 cubic meters to approximately 2,500, and could fall to 1,700 by 2030 – a threshold associated with chronic scarcity.

At the same time, inefficiencies compound the problem: up to 40 percent of water is lost through outdated irrigation systems, while agriculture consumes roughly 80 percent of available resources.

Climate change is intensifying these pressures. Under high warming scenarios, up to 80 percent of the region’s glaciers could disappear, further reducing already limited water supplies.

At the same time, experts increasingly note that the region’s water crisis is not just by scarcity, but also by inefficiencies in management, outdated infrastructure, and the lack of coordinated regional governance. 

Nuclear energy introduces a structural tension into this already fragile system. Nuclear power plants require substantial volumes of water for cooling. Globally, they rank among the most water-intensive forms of energy generation.

This raises a broader question: are large-scale infrastructure decisions are being fully aligned with long-term resource constraints? 

Location is critical. Uzbekistan’s planned nuclear site lies near the Aydar-Arnasay lake system, including Lake Tuzkan, a hydrologically sensitive area.

Water expert Bulat Yessekin notes that such a facility could consume more than 70 million cubic meters of water annually, an amount comparable to a large city.

He warns that this demand, combined with thermal pollution, could accelerate ecosystem degradation, particularly in the Aral Sea basin, which has already lost up to 92 percent of its water volume.

Technological solutions such as dry cooling can reduce water use – in some cases by up to 90 percent – but they do not eliminate the underlying constraint.

The implications of Uzbekistan’s nuclear power ambitions extend beyond environmental concerns. In Central Asia, water is central to both economic stability and regional security. 

According to Elyor Usmanov, a core challenge lies in the absence of integrated water-energy planning. Without it, infrastructure designed to solve one problem may intensify another. This is particularly relevant in a region defined by transboundary rivers. Projections suggest that new infrastructure projects, including Uzbekistan’s NPP and Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, could reduce the flow of the Amu Darya by 8 to 20 percent.

Afghanistan, which historically withdrew only limited volumes of water from the Amu Darya basin, is increasingly asserting its claim to a share of these resources. The country is, at present, in a water crisis.  Officials in Kabul emphasize that their position is grounded in the legitimate right to equitable use of transboundary waters, while also expressing readiness to cooperate with neighboring states.

As Afghan representatives have stated, the country’s objective is “to receive only what it is entitled to,” framing its water policy not as a challenge to regional stability, but as part of a broader push for balanced and lawful resource distribution.

An Array of Risks 

Beyond water consumption, nuclear infrastructure introduces long-term environmental and health risks. 

Ozharovsky warns that the most serious dangers arise when radioactive materials enter water systems, where they can lead to prolonged internal exposure through drinking water and food chains.

A large-scale study in the United States (2000–2018) identified approximately 115,000 cancer deaths – or around 6,400 annually – statistically associated with proximity to nuclear power plants.

While such findings remain debated, they underscore the importance of long-term monitoring, transparency, and risk governance.

Even where probabilities are low, the consequences of inadvertent exposure or accidents can be severe.

In a worst-case scenario, damage to reactor systems could release radioactive elements such as iodine, cesium, and strontium, with contamination spreading across hundreds of kilometers. In today’s geopolitical environment, nuclear facilities may also be viewed as strategic vulnerabilities.

The economic dimension of nuclear energy is equally uncertain, as are the full geopolitical repercussions of Uzbekistan’s NPP.

Globally, large-scale nuclear projects often face delays and cost overruns. In one case, projected costs rose from $9.8 billion to $25 billion during implementation.

In some instances, projects are abandoned altogether, leaving financial burdens that ultimately fall on taxpayers. Russia’s role extends beyond construction to include fuel supply, maintenance, and long-term operation. This creates a structural dependence, one that must be actively managed through diversification and the development of domestic expertise. These kinds of arrangements arrangements, while common in nuclear energy projects, may also limit flexibility over time, particularly in areas such as fuel supply, maintenance, and technological upgrades.

Uzbekistan’s nuclear ambitions reflect a rational response to real challenges: rising demand, aging infrastructure, and economic transformation. But nuclear energy is not a neutral solution.

In a region where water availability has already fallen from 8,400 to 2,500 cubic meters per capita – and continues to decline – the introduction of a water-intensive energy system creates a structural tension.

The question is not whether Uzbekistan needs more energy – it does – but whether Tashkent’s seeking of long-term energy stability via nuclear power can be achieved without intensifying the region’s unfolding water crisis.